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                                OPINION 
                                   _______________ 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.  
 This is an interlocutory appeal of a denial of class 
certification in a suit alleging that Widener University School 
of Law defrauded a putative class of law students by 
publishing misleading statistics about its graduates’ 
employment, which caused the students to pay “inflated” 
tuition.  The District Court found, among other things, that 
the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that common 
questions predominate over individual questions in order for a 
class to be certified.  We conclude that, although the District 
Court labored under a few misconceptions about the 
plaintiffs’ theory of the case, the errors were harmless and the 
court ultimately reached the correct result.  Even when 
properly characterized, the plaintiffs’ theory is insufficiently 
supported by class-wide evidence, and therefore the plaintiffs 
have not established that common questions will 
predominate.  For that reason, we will affirm.     
 
I. 
 
 Named plaintiffs John Harnish, Justin Schluth, Robert 
Klein, Gregory Emond, Ayla O’Brien Kravitz, and Christina 
Marinakis are graduates of Widener University School of 
Law (“Widener”), a private law school with campuses in 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and Wilmington, Delaware, who 
graduated from Widener between 2008 and 2011.  In a 
complaint filed in the United States District Court for the 
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District of New Jersey on February 1, 2012, and amended on 
April 27, 2012, they claim that Widener violated the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”) and the Delaware 
Consumer Fraud Act (“DCFA”) by intentionally publishing 
and marketing misleading statistics about the employment of 
its graduates.   
 
 Specifically, they allege the following.  Between 2005 
and 2011, Widener reported that 90-97% of its students were 
employed after graduation.  These numbers were widely and 
deliberately advertised in print and online publications, along 
with oral presentations, targeting prospective students.  But in 
reality, only 50-70% of Widener graduates ended up in full-
time legal positions, which Widener knew.  The school was 
including non-legal and part-time positions in its published 
statistics without reporting the breakdown.  When Widener 
did provide a breakdown in its materials, it was a breakdown 
by employer type (private firm, business and industry, etc.) 
within the category of full-time legal employment, further 
misleading prospective students into believing that the 90-
97% number represented full-time legal employment.  
Beginning in 2011, Widener improved its reporting 
somewhat, by including a breakdown that distinguished 
between full-time legal positions and other jobs.  But, 
according to the plaintiffs, Widener continued to gather 
information about its graduates in a manner that distorted the 
statistics by, for example, crediting unreliable secondhand 
accounts of graduates’ employment and avoiding responses 
from unemployed graduates.  
 
 The plaintiffs claim that publishing misleading 
employment statistics enabled Widener to charge its students 
“inflated” tuition — that is, higher tuition than what Widener 
would have received if full and accurate statistics were 
published instead.  Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 90 (Amended 
Compl. ¶ 1).  And they seek damages equal to the amount of 
tuition that students allegedly overpaid.  Widener moved to 
dismiss the case, but the motion was denied on March 20, 
2013.  The parties then engaged in discovery related to class 
certification.      
 
 On February 2, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a 
class of “[a]ll persons who enrolled in Widener University 
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School of Law and were charged full or part-time tuition 
within the statutory period for the six-year period prior to the 
date the Complaint in this action was filed through the date 
that this Class is certified.”  J.A. 210.  A disputed issue 
regarding class certification was whether the plaintiffs could 
prove in class-wide fashion that all the class members 
suffered damages as a result of Widener’s actions.  In 
addressing this issue, the plaintiffs introduced a report of 
economics expert Dr. Donald Martin.  Dr. Martin attested that 
he would be able to estimate the extent to which Widener’s 
misleading statistics inflated the tuition, which could serve as 
a class-wide estimate of every class member’s damages, 
insofar as every class member, by definition, paid tuition.  In 
order to arrive at his estimate, he would perform a regression 
analysis of 64 private law schools’ published tuition and 
employment statistics and, by controlling for other variables, 
compute how much lower Widener’s tuition would be 
expected to be if full and accurate employment statistics were 
published instead.  Noting that further discovery was 
forthcoming and complete data was unavailable, Dr. Martin 
did not provide a final estimate of class-wide damages.  He 
did, however, conclude that there was a statistically 
significant relationship between employment rates and tuition 
prices across the 64 schools and that his regression 
methodology would be a reliable means of arriving at a final 
estimate of class-wide damages.   
 
 On July 1, 2015, the District Court denied class 
certification on two grounds.  First, it found that the plaintiffs 
could not meet Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s 
requirement that common questions “predominate” over 
individual questions because they had “not shown that they 
c[ould] prove the proposed class members’ damages by 
common evidence.”  J.A. 13.  The District Court rejected Dr. 
Martin’s proposed class-wide method of proving damages, 
pointing to the variation in class members’ employment 
outcomes:  some Widener graduates did obtain full-time legal 
jobs, and so their damages, if any, would be different from 
those of graduates who did not.  The District Court also 
concluded that the proposed class-wide theory of damages 
relied on a “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which New Jersey 
courts had rejected outside the federal securities fraud 
context.  
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 Second, the District Court found that the plaintiffs 
could not meet Rule 23(a)(3)’s requirement that the named 
plaintiffs’ claims be “typical” of the claims of the proposed 
class.  Because the plaintiffs sought to certify a class of 
students enrolled “through the date this Class is certified,” the 
class would include students who enrolled in 2012 and 
beyond, after Widener had improved its reporting.  This, 
according to the District Court, would render the named 
plaintiffs atypical in relation to large portions of the class 
because there would be different factual circumstances for the 
post-2011 enrollees.  It also found that some class members 
might even have different interests than the named plaintiffs, 
insofar as those pursuing legal careers might prefer not to 
have Widener’s reputation tarnished by the lawsuit.  
 
 The plaintiffs filed a timely petition for interlocutory 
review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which we 
granted.   
 
II. 
 
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  
“We review a class certification order for abuse of discretion, 
which occurs if the district court’s decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.”  Neale v. Volvo 
Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(quotation marks omitted).  
 
III. 
 
 The plaintiffs raise three challenges to the District 
Court’s finding that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement was not met.  We will address each challenge in 
turn and, for the reasons set forth below, affirm the District 
Court’s denial of class certification.   
 
A. 
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 The plaintiffs’ first argument is that the District Court 
applied an improperly burdensome legal standard under Rule 
23(b)(3) by scrutinizing their class-wide evidence prior to full 
merits discovery and demanding that they “conclusively 
prove class-wide damages.”  Pls.’ Br. 36.  They contend that 
the predominance inquiry should be “entirely divorced from 
the validity of [their] claims” and that the District Court was 
limited to assessing the “viab[ility]” of their theory, not its 
“valid[ity].”  Id. at 35-36.  We disagree.   
 
 A plaintiff “may not merely propose a method of 
[meeting Rule 23’s requirements] without any evidentiary 
support.”  Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 
2013).  And trial courts “must engage in a rigorous analysis 
and find each of Rule 23[ ]’s requirements met by a 
preponderance of the evidence before granting certification.”  
Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 358 (3d Cir. 
2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).  They must do 
so even if it involves judging credibility, weighing evidence, 
or deciding issues that overlap with the merits of a plaintiff’s 
claims.  In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 
305, 316-25 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
 We have observed that “[t]he predominance inquiry is 
especially dependent upon the merits of a plaintiff’s claim, 
since the nature of the evidence that will suffice to resolve a 
question determines whether the question is common or 
individual.”  In re Constar Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 
780 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).  “[B]efore a 
class is certified under [Rule 23(b)(3)], a district court must 
find that ‘questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members.’”  Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 
1036, 1045 (2016) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).  As 
defined by the Supreme Court, “[a]n individual question is 
one where members of a proposed class will need to present 
evidence that varies from member to member, while a 
common question is one where the same evidence will suffice 
for each member to make a prima facie showing [or] the issue 
is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “the 
common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case [be] more 
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prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-
defeating, individual issues.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 In determining whether issues that are “susceptible to 
generalized, class-wide proof” are “more prevalent or 
important,” id., a district court is called to “formulate some 
prediction as to how specific issues will play out . . . in a 
given case,” Hydrogen, 552 F.3d at 311.  The court cannot 
rely on a mere “threshold showing” that a proposed class-
wide method of proof is “plausible in theory.”  Id. at 321, 
325.  Rather, the court’s Rule 23(b)(3) finding necessarily 
entails some analysis of whether the proposed class-wide 
evidence will actually be sufficient for the class to prevail on 
the predominant issues in the case.  If class-wide evidence is 
lacking, the court cannot be adequately assured that 
individualized evidence will not later overwhelm the case and 
render it unsuitable for class-wide adjudication.  This analysis 
will often resemble a merits determination, in that it relates to 
plaintiffs’ ability to prove the elements of their claims.   
 
 But the analysis is not a merits determination.  First, 
much like a court’s preview of the merits of a case when 
imposing a preliminary injunction, “the district court’s 
findings for the purpose of class certification are conclusive 
on that topic” but “do not bind the fact-finder on the merits.”  
Id. at 318 & n.19.  Second, a court should not address merits-
related issues “beyond what is necessary to determine 
preliminarily whether certain elements will necessitate 
individual or common proof.”  Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 
F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc).  In certain situations, 
it may be unnecessary to analyze the class-wide evidence as 
to every issue in the case in order to reach a conclusion about 
Rule 23(b)(3).  For example, if the court decides that the 
central, predominant issues in the case are common, then 
Rule 23(b)(3) is met despite the possibility that some 
subsidiary issues will require individualized evidence.  Tyson, 
136 S. Ct. at 1045.  Further, evidence as to an issue or 
element need not be produced at class certification where the 
very nature of the issue or element guarantees that all class 
members’ claims will “prevail or fail in unison,” and 
therefore there is “no risk whatever that a failure of proof on 
the common question . . . will result in individual questions 
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predominating.”  Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust 
Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191, 1196 (2013).   
 
 Thus, the task for the District Court was to determine 
whether the plaintiffs’ proposed class-wide theories and 
evidence would be sufficient to address the predominant 
issues in the case.  The issues in the case are defined by the 
elements of a NJCFA/DCFA claim, which are:  “(1) an 
unlawful practice, (2) an ascertainable loss, and (3) a causal 
relationship between the unlawful conduct and the 
ascertainable loss.”  Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 25 
A.3d 1103, 1115 (N.J. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); 
accord Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund v. AstraZeneca 
Pharm. LP, 136 A.3d 688, 693 (Del. 2016).1  
 
 The plaintiffs criticize the District Court’s focus on 
“damages,” and they invoke the general rule that “individual 
damages calculations do not preclude class certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3).”  Neale, 794 F.3d at 375.  But the plaintiffs 
gloss over the fact that when courts speak of “damages,” they 
are often referring to two distinct concepts:  the “fact of 
damage” and the measure/amount of damages.  The fact of 
damage, often synonymous with “injury” or “impact,” is 
frequently an element of liability requiring plaintiffs to prove 
that they have suffered some harm traceable to the 
defendant’s conduct — in other words, the “ascertainable 
loss” and “causal relationship” requirements under the 
NJCFA and the DCFA.  See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 187-89 (3d Cir. 2001); In 
re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 269 (3d Cir. 
2009); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535-
36 (6th Cir. 2008); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. 
Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 19 n.18, 28 (1st Cir. 2008).  Only 
if the fact of damage is established does a court reach the 
question of remedy and the exact calculation of each 
plaintiff’s damages.  “While obstacles to calculating damages 
may not preclude class certification, the putative class must 
                                              
 1 The parties have stipulated that there are no material 
differences between New Jersey and Delaware law 
concerning the issues in this case.  Where appropriate, we 
have cited law from both states, but the majority of the 
authority comes from the New Jersey courts.   
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first demonstrate economic loss” — that is, the fact of 
damage — “on a common basis.”  Newton, 259 F.3d at 189.  
 
 We are confident that, in scrutinizing the plaintiffs’ 
proposed class-wide theory and evidence of damages, the 
District Court was concerned not merely with the plaintiffs’ 
ability to calculate the precise measure of damages, but rather 
with their ability to demonstrate the fact of damage — 
“ascertainable loss” and a “causal relationship” — class-wide.  
Ascertainable loss and a causal relationship being core 
elements of liability under the NJCFA and the DCFA, it was 
entirely appropriate for the District Court to examine the 
plaintiffs’ theory of damages and the proof supporting it.    
 
 As to the plaintiffs’ general objection to the level of 
scrutiny that the District Court applied to their class-wide 
evidence, we see no indication that the District Court applied 
the wrong legal standard.  For the reasons already elaborated, 
closely scrutinizing the plaintiffs’ proposed class-wide 
method of proof was the District Court’s duty under Rule 23 
and did not, as the plaintiffs argue, transform the court’s 
decision into a premature merits determination.  Nor did the 
District Court purport to be deciding the merits of the case 
“conclusively,” as the plaintiffs now assert.  The District 
Court’s analysis of the evidence was in service of predicting 
whether the class-wide proof would ultimately suffice, which 
it was required to do.  And whatever distinction the plaintiffs 
are attempting to draw between “viable” class-wide proof and 
“valid” class-wide proof, the law is clear that a class-wide 
method of proof must be more than “plausible in theory” and 
that a district court is to consider “all relevant evidence and 
arguments” in predicting whether the class-wide proof will 
suffice.  Hydrogen, 552 F.3d at 325.  Whether the District 
Court reached the correct conclusion after considering the 
evidence and arguments is a separate issue that we will 
address below.     
 
B. 
 
 Next, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court 
erroneously attributed significance to the fact that some 
Widener graduates do obtain full-time legal employment 
(meaning that some class members suffered little, if any, 
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damage to their career prospects), effectively ignoring that the 
plaintiffs’ theory of damages is unrelated to class members’ 
actual employment outcomes.  In other words, they argue that 
the District Court injected an individualized question 
(employment outcomes) that has never been at issue because 
they claim damages only in the form of overpaid tuition, 
which is common to all Widener graduates regardless of their 
employment outcomes.  While we agree that class members’ 
own individual employment outcomes are not at issue in this 
case, we conclude that the error was harmless because, as 
discussed in a later portion of this opinion, the inflated-tuition 
theory of damages that is at issue has not been adequately 
supported by class-wide evidence, which precludes class 
certification under Rule 23(b)(3).   
 
 It is apparent that the plaintiffs’ proposed theory of the 
case does not involve an assessment of class members’ own 
individual employment outcomes — a point that Widener 
appears to concede.  Although the amended complaint does 
request “damages” in general language, in several places it 
frames the damages in terms of “inflated tuition.”  J.A. 116-
22.  The plaintiffs also made clear in their brief in support of 
class certification that inflated tuition was their sole proposed 
theory of damages.  And they have done so in their briefing 
before us.   
 
 Further, in the abstract, we perceive no conceptual 
problem with the plaintiffs’ proposed theory.  The NJCFA 
and the DCFA both contemplate so-called “out-of-pocket” 
damages.  Under the out-of-pocket rule, a plaintiff’s damages 
are “the difference between the price paid and the actual 
value of the property acquired.”  Romano v. Galaxy Toyota, 
945 A.2d 49, 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008); accord 
Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1076 (Del. 
1983).  That is exactly what the plaintiffs are seeking.  Pls.’ 
Br. 17-18 (“Plaintiffs seek the difference between the tuition 
that students paid and tuition that they would have paid in the 
absence of Widener’s misleading marketing . . . .”); 24-25 
(“The only loss Plaintiffs seek to recover is the incremental 
difference between the amount of tuition that Widener could 
have charged but for its fraudulent mass-marketing scheme 
and the tuition it actually charged.”).  
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 Neither the “price paid” nor the “actual value” depends 
on class members’ own individual employment outcomes.  
For the price paid, that is self-evident.  For the actual value, it 
is less obvious.  Actual value in a fraud case is generally 
“determined as of the time of the transaction.”  Kaufman v. 
Mellon Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 366 F.2d 326, 331 (3d Cir. 
1966) (applying Pennsylvania law); Sands v. Forrest, 434 
A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“[I]n an action for fraud 
and deceit the measure of damages is the difference in value 
between the real, or market, value of the property at the time 
of the transaction and the higher, or fictitious, value which the 
buyer was induced to pay for it.”).2  In the fraud context, the 
actual value of a degree program therefore does not depend 
on a student’s own individual post-graduation employment 
outcome, because no one knows at the time of enrollment 
what that outcome will be.  Some students will ultimately 
obtain full-time legal jobs after graduation while others will 
not, but at the time of enrollment, the Widener degree offers 
them a particular probability of full-time legal employment.  
It is the time-of-enrollment probability of full-time legal 
employment (which the then-available aggregate employment 
statistics help to predict), rather than an individual student’s 
own future employment outcome, that affects the true/actual 
market value of a Widener education.3  
 
 The plaintiffs’ theory is therefore that, irrespective of 
what ultimately happened to class members after graduation, 
the actual value of their Widener education depended in part 
                                              
 2 To the extent that the “market” price at the time of 
the transaction might itself be inflated due to widespread 
dissemination of the misrepresentation, one must ascertain the 
fair price that would be paid if the broader market knew the 
truth.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 549 cmt. c.   
 3 As a loose analogy, a lottery ticket’s actual value at 
sale does not retroactively plummet to zero the moment a 
purchaser loses or skyrocket the moment a purchaser wins.  If 
the odds were honestly presented, all purchasers received 
exactly what they paid for, and neither a loser nor a winner 
could claim any damages.  And if the odds were 
misrepresented, both players would have the same damages 
arising from the fraud — namely, they were overcharged for 
placing their bets.   
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on the probability of full-time legal employment that they 
faced when enrolling.  Thus, all class members ended up 
paying more than Widener’s actual value because the 
published employment statistics (the key indicators of the 
probability of full-time legal employment) were misleadingly 
optimistic in comparison to the reality of the situation.    
 
 We suspect that when it noted the significance of 
varying individual employment outcomes, the District Court 
may have had in mind a different theory of damages known 
as the “benefit-of-the-bargain” rule, which is also available 
under the NJCFA and the DCFA.  Under this rule, a plaintiff 
can claim damages “equal to that which [the] plaintiff would 
have received had the representation been true,” Finderne 
Mgmt. Co. v. Barrett, 955 A.2d 940, 957 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2008) (quotation marks omitted), sometimes also 
referred to as the “replacement cost,” “replacement value,” or 
the “diminution” or “loss in value” from the purchaser’s 
“expectation interest,” Lee v. Carter-Reed Co., 4 A.3d 561, 
576 (N.J. 2010); Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 
872 A.2d 783, 789, 792 (N.J. 2005); Furst v. Einstein 
Moomjy, Inc., 860 A.2d 435, 440-42 (N.J. 2004); accord 
Stephenson, 462 A.2d at 1076.  The District Court noted that 
some Widener students “actually got the advertised jobs” — 
saying, in effect, that they got what they were promised (a 
benefit-of-the-bargain perspective), rather than that they got 
something worth what they paid (an out-of-pocket 
perspective).  J.A. 60.  If full-time legal employment post-
graduation was in fact the “advertised” benefit of the bargain, 
then employment outcomes would be relevant to benefit-of-
the-bargain damages.  But we are skeptical of the notion that 
Widener was guaranteeing any particular employment 
outcome.  More likely, the represented value of a Widener 
education to a particular student, like its actual value, is a 
function of the probabilistic career-advancing potential of the 
education (as claimed, in the case of represented value, versus 
as truly existing, in the case of actual value), irrespective of 
whether that individual student ultimately realizes the 
potential.   
 
 In any event, we do not understand the plaintiffs to be 
seeking benefit-of-the-bargain damages.  Although the 
plaintiffs have not explicitly invoked the out-of-pocket rule 
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rather than the benefit-of-the-bargain rule and have cited 
cases involving both rules, they describe the damages they 
seek in out-of-pocket terms.  So even if class members’ own 
individual employment outcomes would be relevant to 
determining the represented value of the bargain, they are not 
relevant to this case.   
 
 In this respect, the District Court appears to have 
mischaracterized the plaintiffs’ theory of damages and 
thereby incorporated an individualized issue that was 
irrelevant to the case before it.  Further, we cannot agree with 
Widener that the District Court’s discussion of class 
members’ differing employment outcomes was a mere aside 
that had no impact on the court’s analysis.  The District Court 
clearly attributed some significance to the individual 
employment outcomes.     
 
 We conclude, however, that the mischaracterization 
was harmless because the District Court would very likely 
have reached the same decision regarding Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement despite the mischaracterization.  
Eliminating any focus on class members’ actual employment 
outcomes would have removed one individualized inquiry.  
But even when the plaintiffs’ inflated-tuition theory is 
properly understood, the crucial overarching issue in the case 
— proving that each class member suffered damages as a 
result of Widener’s actions — still must be shown to be 
susceptible to class-wide proof.  We now turn to that issue.4   
 
C. 
 
  Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the District Court 
erred in equating their theory with the non-cognizable, 
                                              
 4 The plaintiffs contend that the District Court not only 
mischaracterized their theory of damages but also, in doing 
so, violated the law-of-the-case doctrine, because the court, in 
its earlier decision denying Widener’s motion to dismiss, had 
deemed class members’ own individual employment 
outcomes to be irrelevant to the plaintiffs’ case.  Having 
already concluded that the District Court’s discussion of class 
members’ employment outcomes was erroneous but harmless, 
we have no need to address this argument.   
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reliance-based “fraud-on-the-market” theory, and contend 
that they have sufficient class-wide evidence to support a 
non-reliance-based inflated-tuition theory.  The plaintiffs are 
correct that “fraud on the market” is not quite the proper label 
for their theory, and correct that they are free to pursue non-
reliance-based theories of damages.  But among non-reliance-
based theories, the plaintiffs’ chosen inflated-tuition theory 
— whatever might be said about its plausibility — belongs to 
the “price-inflation” species that, like the fraud-on-the-market 
theory, has been rejected by the New Jersey and Delaware 
courts outside the federal securities fraud context.  We 
therefore reach the same conclusion as the District Court, 
despite employing slightly different terminology:  the 
plaintiffs fail to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 
23(b)(3) because the only class-wide evidence of damages 
that they offer supports a non-cognizable theory. 
 
 As discussed above, the plaintiffs appear to be 
pursuing out-of-pocket damages, claiming that Widener’s 
misrepresentations caused them to pay more for their 
education than it was truly worth.  Under this theory, we look 
to the injuries that resulted from the defendant’s having made 
the misrepresentation in the first place, and the goal is to 
return the plaintiffs to the position that they would have 
occupied if the misrepresentation had never been made.  See, 
e.g., Stephenson, 462 A.2d at 1076; Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 549 cmt. g (1977); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom 
Reliance Interest in Tort Damages, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
169, 171-76 (2001).5  In an ordinary fraud case, this would 
                                              
 5 A benefit-of-the-bargain claim, by contrast, is 
contract-like.  We look to the injuries that resulted from the 
defendant’s having not lived up to the misrepresentation, and 
the goal is to place the plaintiffs in the position that they 
would occupy if the misrepresentation were true.  See Furst, 
860 A.2d at 441-42; Stephenson, 462 A.2d at 1076; Smajlaj 
v. Campbell Soup Co., 782 F. Supp. 2d 84, 101-02 (D.N.J. 
2011); Kelly, supra, at 171-76.  We do not interpret the 
plaintiffs’ argument as a benefit-of-the-bargain claim because 
the success of such a claim would not depend on proving that 
the misrepresentation caused higher purchase prices.  A 
benefit-of-the-bargain class action logically does not entail 
proving that all class members were induced to pay extra (a 
15 
 
require the plaintiffs to prove that the misrepresentation 
entered their decision-making and induced them to pay more 
for something than they would have otherwise — in other 
words, prove reliance.  But the plaintiffs do not purport to 
have class-wide proof of reliance, in the traditional sense, on 
the part of every single class member.  Nor could they; 
reliance is nearly always an individualized question, requiring 
case-by-case determinations of what effect, if any, the 
misrepresentation had on plaintiffs’ decision-making.6   
                                                                                                     
reliance-based theory) or even that the defendant was 
empowered to charge them all extra (the price-inflation 
theory that the plaintiffs have unsuccessfully pursued in this 
case, discussed infra).  Instead, it entails proving that class 
members all reasonably expected more from the bargain than 
what they received.  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 
F.3d 583, 607-08 (3d Cir. 2012); Smajlaj, 782 F. Supp. 2d at 
99-100.     
 6 For example, where “a plaintiff cannot invoke the 
fraud-on-the-market presumption” in a securities fraud case, 
“[s]he can . . . attempt to establish reliance through the 
traditional mode of demonstrating that she was personally 
aware of [the defendant’s] statement and engaged in a 
relevant transaction . . . based on that specific 
misrepresentation,” but “[i]ndividualized reliance issues 
would predominate in such a lawsuit.”  Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 
1199 (quotation marks omitted). 
 Without the aid of the broad presumption afforded by 
the fraud-on-the-market theory, plaintiffs will rarely be able 
to prove in class-wide fashion that all class members relied on 
misrepresentations and were induced to pay more for 
something than they would have otherwise.  In Lee, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court recognized that, where there are 
extraordinary facts involving a “worthless product” about 
which “all the representations . . . are baseless,” “a trier of 
fact may fairly infer that a[ll] consumer[s] purchasing the 
product w[ere] influenced, in some way or other, by the false-
marketing scheme.”  Lee, 4 A.3d at 580 (emphasis added).  
But the court also recognized that, in the absence of such a 
situation, determining whether each “purchaser bought the 
product based on a fictional or real benefit” — here, the 
misleading employment statistics versus Widener’s many 
other real attributes — remains “a perplexing problem, the 
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 The District Court appears to have believed that the 
plaintiffs were attempting to prove reliance class-wide by 
way of the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption.  It likely 
believed so because the goal of Dr. Martin’s analysis was to 
prove that the market that determines law school tuition 
prices is an “efficient” market, meaning a market in which 
price responds to publicly available information about the 
value of the product.  But an “efficient-market” theory and a 
“fraud-on-the-market” theory are not the same, even though, 
as shorthand, courts sometimes use the terms interchangeably.  
  
 The connection between the two terms comes from the 
federal securities fraud context, where courts will often find 
an efficient market to exist, in which “information important 
to reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated into 
stock prices.”  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 
F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997).  Once a securities market is 
found to be efficient, the fraud-on-the-market theory employs 
the efficient-market finding as the “intellectual underpinning” 
for why individualized proof of reliance is not required.  
Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1198 (N.J. 2000).  
The theory “‘is based on the hypothesis that, in an open and 
developed securities market, . . . [m]isleading statements will 
. . . defraud purchasers of stock even if the purchasers do not 
directly rely on the misstatements.’”  Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 
485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988) (quoting Peil v. Speiser, 806 
F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1986)).  As we have explained in 
greater detail:  
 
The fraud-on-the-market theory creates a 
threefold presumption of indirect reliance.  
First, [per an efficient-market finding,] this 
court presumes that the misrepresentation 
affected the market price.  Second, it presumes 
that a purchaser did in fact rely on the price of 
the stock as indicative of its value.  Third, it 
presumes the reasonableness of that reliance.  
All of these presumptions are necessary to 
establish actual reliance.  The first presumption 
is necessary to find that a misrepresentation was 
                                                                                                     
resolution of which would depend on a number of individual 
inquiries.”  Id. at 579.    
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in fact made to the purchaser.  Thus, if 
defendant rebuts this presumption by showing 
that the market did not respond to the 
misrepresentation, it does no more than show 
that the market price was not misrepresentative, 
and thus that no misrepresentation was made to 
the purchaser of the stock.  The second 
presumption is necessary for a court to find that 
the plaintiff did in fact rely on the 
misrepresentation.  Thus, a defendant may rebut 
this presumption by showing that the plaintiff 
would have purchased even if he had known 
about the misrepresentation.  The final 
presumption, that reliance on the market price is 
reasonable, may be rebutted by showing that the 
plaintiff knows that a representation is false. 
Zlotnick v. TIE Commc’ns, 836 F.2d 818, 822 (3d Cir. 1988) 
(emphasis added); see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1161.    
 
 Plaintiffs who claim that a market is efficient, 
accordingly, may try to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption, because an efficient market is a precondition of 
the fraud-on-the-market theory.  But some plaintiffs, 
including the plaintiffs in this case, may have other reasons 
for claiming that a market is efficient.7  Although the District 
Court was correct that the New Jersey courts have declined to 
extend the fraud-on-the-market presumption beyond the 
federal securities fraud context, Kaufman, 754 A.2d at 1200-
01, that was beside the point because the plaintiffs have not 
                                              
 7 At one point in their briefing, the plaintiffs muddy 
the waters by appearing to disclaim even an efficient-market 
theory.  They argue that “the inquiry is not whether 
Widener’s tuition responded to employment data, but what 
Widener’s tuition would have been absent its fraudulent 
marketing scheme.”  Reply Br. 17 n.8.  But that sentence is 
incoherent and incompatible with the thrust of their argument.  
They cannot claim that tuition would have been different 
“absent [a] fraudulent marketing scheme” involving 
employment data unless they also believe that “tuition 
respond[s] to employment data.”   
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quite invoked the fraud-on-the-market presumption.8  The 
plaintiffs do not and need not argue the fraud-on-the-market 
theory because, as they rightly point out, the NJCFA and the 
DCFA do not require reliance on a misrepresentation in order 
to establish a “causal relationship” between that 
misrepresentation and an “ascertainable loss,” and other non-
reliance forms of “causal relationship” (under a “proximate 
cause” standard) are permissible.  Marcus v. BMW of N. 
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 606 (3d Cir. 2012); Lee, 4 A.3d at 
576, 580; AstraZeneca, 136 A.3d at 693-94.  See generally 
supra note 5 (discussing benefit-of-the-bargain claims); John 
C. P. Goldberg et al., The Place of Reliance in Fraud, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1001, 1004-14 (2006) (discussing examples of 
how causation can still exist when reliance is lacking).  What 
the plaintiffs seek to establish is the existence of an efficient 
market for law school tuition — which is a prerequisite to, 
rather than an element established by, a fraud-on-the-market 
argument.   
 
 The plaintiffs have placed market efficiency at issue 
by citing Dr. Martin’s analysis suggesting that tuition at 
Widener and elsewhere responds to public information, 
including employment statistics.  In that respect, the District 
Court’s analysis was correct.  But the plaintiffs do so not to 
benefit from a presumption of reliance but rather for the 
purpose of supporting their theory of “price inflation.”  Given 
their out-of-pocket damages claim, the plaintiffs must prove 
that Widener’s publication of misleading employment 
statistics worsened all class members’ positions, by causing 
them to pay more for something than it was worth.  The 
existence of an efficient market, they argue, would permit 
them to prove that all class members’ positions were 
worsened by the publication of misleading employment 
statistics because Widener, as an efficient-market actor 
responding to those statistics, charged everyone higher 
tuition, regardless of whether the statistics impacted each 
individual class member’s decision-making as a consumer.  
                                              
 8 As with the District Court’s mischaracterization of 
the relevance of class members’ own individual employment 
outcomes, we are confident that the misapplied “fraud-on-the-
market” label was harmless and that the District Court’s 
concerns about the plaintiffs’ class-wide proof were valid.   
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That is, rather than proving that the misrepresentations 
induced each class member to pay more, they propose to 
prove that the misrepresentations empowered Widener to 
charge more across the entire market.       
 
  There is some plausibility to this theory, insofar as law 
schools operate in a largely fixed-price market, not an 
auction-style market with individually matched asks and bids.  
Widener does not ask around to determine the highest price 
that it can charge each prospective student.  One would 
imagine that Widener guesses the wisest across-the-board 
tuition to charge based on a reading of the market and a self-
assessment of how prospective students, as a whole, perceive 
the school, including its employment statistics.9  It arguably 
does not matter that some prospective students might be 
entirely unaware of or unconcerned by Widener’s 
employment statistics (and, if they were bidders in an 
auction-style market, would not change their bids in response 
to different employment statistics).  The point is that Widener 
might be expected to anticipate greater student demand in 
response to misleading employment statistics and thus to 
charge all students a higher price than it would have if it had 
published full and accurate statistics instead.   
 
 The problem for the plaintiffs is that the state courts 
have held that the ascertainable-loss and causal-relationship 
elements of the NJCFA and the DCFA are not met by the 
kind of price-inflation theory discussed above and advanced 
by the plaintiffs.  In International Union of Operating 
Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 
A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007) (per curiam), the New Jersey Supreme 
Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt “to prove only that the 
price charged for Vioxx was higher than it should have been 
as a result of defendant’s fraudulent marketing campaign, and 
. . . thereby to be relieved of the usual requirements [of] 
prov[ing] an ascertainable loss.”  Id. at 1088.  The court’s 
“rejection of the theoretical basis for that proof mechanism 
remove[d] it as a potential common question entirely,” and 
thus individualized questions about how the “diverse group” 
                                              
 9 Financial aid packages are, of course, a means of 
customizing the price somewhat to respond to individual 
students’ price thresholds.   
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of class members reacted to the alleged fraud predominated 
instead and precluded class certification.  Id. at 1087, 1088; 
see also Dabush v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 874 A.2d 
1110, 1121 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); N.J. Citizen 
Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 178-79 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).  Similarly, in AstraZeneca, the 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to 
establish damages based on the mere fact that they “would 
have paid a lower ‘market’ price if all [market] participants 
had been fully informed.”  AstraZeneca, 136 A.3d at 696-97.  
What mattered instead was that the plaintiffs themselves were 
fully informed that the advertising was misleading.  Id.    
  
 The state courts, like the District Court in this case, 
have emphasized that recognizing “price inflation” as a 
“cause” of “ascertainable loss” is essentially the same as 
extending the fraud-on-the-market presumption to all 
consumer-fraud cases.  The practical effect of both theories is 
indeed the same, and both depend on the existence of an 
efficient market.  There is a conceptual difference between a 
“fraud-on-the-market” theory and a “price-inflation” theory 
— the former deems a price to be a representation and 
presumes that buyers relied on it, whereas the latter sidesteps 
reliance altogether.  The distinction, however, is immaterial 
because the state courts have refused to recognize either 
theory outside the federal securities fraud context.10    
                                              
 10 Even if a price-inflation theory were cognizable 
under state law, the plaintiffs would still be required to do 
more than propose it as an economically plausible theory; 
they would need to provide proof that price inflation actually 
occurred on this occasion, as a result of the specific 
misrepresentation at issue.  We have serious doubts about 
whether they could do so.  They offer no direct evidence that 
Widener changed its prices in response to the employment 
statistics that it published and their anticipated effect on the 
overall market.  It appears that the plaintiffs did at one point 
seek discovery of “[a]ny information related to Widener’s 
strategies, methodologies, policies, and procedures regarding 
the setting of Widener’s tuition prices,” to which Widener 
objected.  D.C. Dkt. No. 59, at 10, 12.  But it is the plaintiffs’ 
burden to build a record to support class certification, and 
they did not pursue the discovery issue below or on appeal.   
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 The plaintiffs have therefore failed to propose a 
cognizable theory of damages that is sufficiently supported by 
class-wide evidence.  And because the fact of damages (an 
“ascertainable loss” having a “causal relationship” with 
Widener’s conduct) is a crucial issue in the case, the inability 
to resolve it in class-wide fashion will cause individual 
questions to predominate over common ones, which 
precludes class certification.11   
 
 
                                                                                                     
 All we have is Dr. Martin’s analysis of data from 64 
private law schools and his preliminary estimate of the dollar 
amount by which “average tuition costs” rose across that 64-
school sample for each “percentage point increase in reported 
employment.”  J.A. 341.  The plaintiffs would therefore have 
the fact-finder infer that because tuition prices across 64 
private law schools tend to vary with employment statistics, 
Widener’s tuition price was influenced by its employment 
statistics on this occasion.  Cf. Tyson, 136 S. Ct. at 1046, 
1048 (observing that “statistical evidence . . . is a permissible 
method of proving classwide liability . . . [if] each class 
member could have relied on th[e] sample to establish 
liability if he or she had brought an individual action” but that 
statistical evidence would not suffice if the class members 
“were not similarly situated”).   
 According to Dr. Martin, his regression equation 
represents the best possible fit for all the data from 64 
schools, and we have no reason to think otherwise.  But that 
strikes us as a separate question from whether the equation 
represents a good fit for Widener.  For all we know after 
consulting Dr. Martin’s rather brief analysis, Widener could 
be an outlier.  In any event, the rejection of the price-inflation 
theory by controlling authority makes it unnecessary for us to 
decide what a fact-finder could reasonably infer about 
Widener’s conduct from Dr. Martin’s analysis of data from 
64 private law schools.    
 11 Affirming the District Court as to Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement makes it unnecessary for us to 
consider the plaintiffs’ challenges to the District Court’s 
finding that Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement was also 
not met.   
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IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the order of the District 
Court will be affirmed. 
 
